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Abstract 
 
Russian Food and Agricultural Policy: How the Country’s Hungry 
History Shapes its Contemporary Approaches 
 
Sarah Alicia Rush, M.P.Aff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Joshua Busby 
 
When the food price spikes of 2007/8 and 2010-12 occurred, Russia responded with export 
restrictions on wheat that contributed to short-term panic, price transmission to importing 
countries, greater long-term price instability and shifting trading patterns. Russia’s actions 
and the subsequent impacts exposed how integrated the formerly-communist country now 
is and how much the global commodity market has shifted since the early 2000s. Today, 
Russia is the top exporter of wheat with its leverage in recipient countries growing, along 
with its ability to take disruptive action through agricultural and food policies. The 
dramatic shift in global wheat markets makes it imperative to understand the motivations 
and potential actions of Russian policymakers. Through an examination of Russia’s food 
history from 1922 to the present, the analysis reveals the enduring impulses that shape 
Russia’s contemporary food policy as a facet of national security and foreign policy 
strategy. The report ends with a brief survey of the circumstances that may impact the 
country’s position as the top exporter and the implications of its dominance for other major 
exporters and import-dependent countries. 
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Chapter I: Rising Bread Prices in Russia 
In July 2007, Russian consumers noticed a sharp increase in the cost of bread. Bread 
prices, which are significantly lower than in the United States and European Union, had 
more than doubled during the year, and prices for basic foodstuffs had increased 17 
percent.1 The increases began only a few months before the December 2007 State Duma 
elections and March 2008 presidential election. They occurred in tandem with state 
approval for a five-year agricultural development program.2 By mid-2008 in Russia, the 
cost of basic foodstuffs was increasing at a rate three times greater than in Europe and had 
become the government’s greatest political liability.3 Russian officials recognized not only 
the welfare burden that the price hikes represented for its electorate, but also the memories 
that it dredged up in a country well-acquainted with food shortages, rationing, and hunger. 
The Kremlin also has a vested interest in keeping food prices low in cities where 
approximately 75 percent of its population resides, as this is the demographic most likely 
to exhibit unrest.4  
Russia was not experiencing this phenomenon alone. The international price of 
cereals began to rise in mid- to late-2007. By 2008, the international price of most food 
commodities had increased by over 50 percent.5 Wheat prices increased by 87 percent with 
a massive spike in March 2008, topping out at $11.05 per bushel. Prior to 2007, the highest 
                                                 
1 Galperovich, Danila and Olga Vakhonicheva, “Russia: Bread Price – And Worries – On the Rise,” Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July 13, 2007. Accessed March 12, 2019. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/1077609.html 
2 Galperovich, Danila, “Alexey Gordeev: bread will rise in price, but there is no reason for panic,” Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July 12, 2007. Accessed March 12, 2019. 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/402047.html 
3 Yasmann, Victor. “Analysis: Global Food Crisis Catches Up with Russia.” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, May 16, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/a/1117497.html 
4 The World Bank. Urban Population (% of total): Russian Federation. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision. Accessed April 
1, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=RU; Hendrix, Cullen S. and 
Stephan Haggard. "Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the developing world." Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 52, no. 2 (2015): 143-157. 
5 Tadasse, Getaw, Bernadina Algieri, Matthias Kalkuhl, and Joachim Von Braun, "Drivers and triggers of 
international food price spikes and volatility," Food Policy, Vol. 47 (2014): 117-128. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.08.014 
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that wheat prices had climbed was $6.77 in April 1996. After a brief respite, global prices 
again rose and fluctuated intensely from 2010 to 2012 with two peaks coming in February 
2011 ($8.67) and July 2012 ($8.98). Since then, prices have continued unevenly downward, 
never reaching pre-crisis lows.6  
That Russia began to feel the pressure of rising prices in early 2007 demonstrates 
the extent to which the country, a formerly-isolated communist economy, has integrated 
into the global market. Not only did this reveal a source of vulnerability for Russia, but 
also a source of influence. In the early 1990s, Russia was a net importer of grains. By the 
time of the food price crisis of 2008, Russia ranked second in wheat exports, accounting 
for 13.1 percent of world totals.7 The 2007/8 food price spike marks one of the first times 
that Russia was in a position to impact the global market through its food policy. In late 
2007, Russia implemented a wheat export tax that was then increased in July 2008. Russia 
responded even more stringently in August 2010 when it banned all wheat exports until 
July 2011, following an intense drought that decimated the country’s summer harvest. 
These restrictive policies were accompanied by other actions such as temporary price 
freezes on socially important foods, state subsidies to the agricultural sector, farm credit 
assistance, and food coupons. Russia’s unilateral action had impacts on the global economy 
that played at least some role in domestic food price increases in markets external to Russia. 
In Russia, even though adequate domestic supply was ensured, producers hoarded grain, 
processors failed to pass on the price savings to consumers, and panicked buyers created 
regional variations in supply. As a result, Russia’s domestic wheat prices tracked with 
                                                 
6 Dollive, Kendall. (2008). The Impact of Export Restraints on Rising Grain Prices, United States 
International Trade Commission Office of Economics (Working Paper No. 2008-09-A) 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/EC200809A.pdf 
7 Götz, Linde, Thomas Glauben, and Bernhard Brümmer. "Wheat export restrictions and domestic market 
effects in Russia and Ukraine during the food crisis." Food Policy, Vol. 38 (2013): 217. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2012.12.001; Sedik, David J., Sergeĭ Sotnikov, and Doris 
Wiesmann. Food security in the Russian Federation. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (2003). 
No. 153. 5. 
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international prices, and retail food prices increased dramatically after the first month of 
the ban.8 
 In the decade since the 2007/8 price spike, Russia’s role in the global wheat and 
food commodity market has only grown. In 2018, the Russian Federation was the top wheat 
exporter accounting for 21.1 percent of the global total. This shift has given Russia a new 
outsized role. More countries have come to rely on its products, and the country’s decisions 
have direct and indirect implications for the stability of global interrelated markets, like 
cereals and oil. Russia is not the only country that can impact the frequency and intensity 
of food price spikes, nor the only one that can wield food power as leverage and influence. 
However, as one of the fastest growing wheat exporters, the Russian Federation’s recent 
ascendancy to the top of the list and its proclivity for restrictive and protectionist policies 
make it an especially critical actor to understand. In recognition of Russia’s promotion to 
a major player in the global grain market, this paper focuses on the political economy of 
food and agricultural policies in Russia. The aim is to understand the explicit and unstated 
motivations for and constraints on their policy decisions now and in the future.  
To accomplish this, the analysis first begins with the objectives of Russia’s modern 
food policy where increased food security, exports and global market share, and increased 
domestic production are presented as a subset of Russia’s overall foreign policy and 
national security strategies. The paper then moves to a historical analysis of Russia’s food 
and agricultural policies to explain how these objectives came to characterize its 
contemporary strategy. Using wheat to anchor the discussion, the paper argues that 
Russia’s long and disastrous food and agricultural history is integral to understanding its 
present food policy decisions. The historical analysis begins with the establishment of the 
Soviet state and progresses through the dissolution of the USSR to the present day. The 
discussion ends with a discussion of Russia’s current status as the top wheat exporter and 
the prospects for its continued dominance. The intent is not to explore these aspects of 
                                                 
8 Welton, George, “The Impact of Russia’s 2010 Grain Export Ban”, Oxfam Research Reports, GeoWel 
Research, June 28, 2011. https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/rr-impact-russias-grain-
export-ban-280611-en_3.pdf 
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Russian history in order to hone them as a political tool, but rather to integrate the realities 
and interpretations of history into the understanding of Russian political economy of food 
and agriculture.  
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Chapter II: Global Price Spikes and the Reactions of Major Exporters  
Price spikes and instability are not uncommon, though the 2007-2012 period was 
marked by unusual instability. As with any globalized phenomenon, the causes of food 
price spikes and volatility are manifold and interrelated. In Russia, droughts and poor 
harvests led to lower grain yields and higher prices. Globally, population growth, biofuel 
demand, and shrinking cereal stocks interacted with rising oil prices, depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar, and generalized inflation to result in a “perfect storm” that disrupted the 
market.9 Disentangling the relative contribution of each causal factor is likely impossible, 
but it is reasonable to expect that many factors, from environmental and climatic to 
macroeconomic and structural, will persist and interact again to create future instability 
and price hikes. Since the 2007-2012 spikes, food prices have not increased to crisis levels 
but have shown continued volatility. After a steady decline since 2010, the annual food 
price index crested in 2017, followed by the cereals price index in 2018.  
 
Figure 1: FAO Annual Food Price Index: Russia (1990-2019) 
                                                 
9 Wiggins, Steve, Sharada Keats, and Julia Compton (2010), “What caused the food price spike of 
2007/08? Lessons for world cereal markets”, UKAID Overseas Development Institute: Food Prices Project 
Report. thttps://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6103.pdf 
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Policy and market reactions to the steep rises in 2007-2012 only intensified the 
spikes. When major grain producing and exporting states detected price increases, some 
implemented policies that exacerbated not only the rise in prices but overall market 
volatility. The USDA estimated that export restrictions accounted for 20 percent of the 
2008 wheat price increase.10 Thirteen countries, including India and China, restricted rice 
exports, and 15 countries restricted wheat exports.11 Russia implemented a 10 percent 
wheat export tax in November 2007 that was raised to 40 percent in December and 
remained in place at its elevated level until July 2008.12 In April 2008, Russia also banned 
wheat exports to Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries. In 2010-12, at the 
sign of trouble, states again took action. International wheat prices had almost doubled by 
mid-2010, as Russia, the European Union, Canada and other key exporters experienced 
harvest failures due to droughts, floods, and other production interruptions, and world 
wheat output dropped by more than 2 percent. A crippling drought shrank Russia’s output 
to only 41.5 million tons down from 62 million tons in 2009, leaving companies unable to 
fulfill contracts. On August 5, 2010, Vladimir Putin, then Russian prime minister, 
announced a ban on all grain exports, including wheat and wheat flour, effective on August 
15. The ban remained in place until July 1, 2011.  
In a globalized world, the policy actions and reactions of governments with a major 
share of the grain market has far-reaching implications. Unilateral and protectionist action 
by major wheat-producing countries creates international market instability that translates 
to domestic food price increases primarily in import-dependent countries. Importing 
countries must either pay the new higher prices or find new suppliers, and the governments 
must find ways to shield their own populations from price increases or suffer the political 
blowback. Even the expectation that an exporter will implement restrictive trade measures 
                                                 
10 “Export Restrictions: Cereal Offender.” The Economist, March 27, 2008. Accessed March 13, 2019. 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2008/03/27/cereal-offenders 
11 Mitra, Siddhartha and Tim Josling. Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications and Trade 
Discipline. International Policy Council: Food and Agricultural Trade, January 2009. 
http://www.agritrade.org/documents/ExportRestrictions_final.pdf 
12 Götz, 217.  
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can contribute to reactive price changes. Through the transmission of international 
instability to domestic markets, the policy decisions of major grain exporters have a real 
impact on the food security of individuals in distant countries. The impact is most intensely 
felt in low-income countries and by the poor, who spend a higher percentage of income on 
food staples, in regions like the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.13 It is also highly 
disruptive in countries where wheat is a major source of calories and the government  uses 
tools like bread subsidies to gain or maintain legitimacy, as in Libya and Egypt. In 2010, 
Russia’s largest wheat export market was Egypt, followed by Turkey, Syria, Iran, and 
Libya, countries that all experienced significant domestic price increases.14 The Arab 
Spring that unfurled across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 has been traced back 
to the period of rising wheat and food prices.15 Images of bread-wielding protestors are a 
compelling visual for the judgment that widespread unrest is linked to some degree to rising 
international and domestic food prices generally and wheat prices specifically.16  But 
domestic price increases also often occur in countries that implement the export 
restrictions, as such policies encourage hoarding, speculation and other destabilizing 
behavior. Thus, mechanisms like export taxes and bans largely fail to protect a state’s own 
population, especially the poor and rural, from rising domestic wheat and bread prices and 
shortages.17 
The food price spikes of 2007/8 and 2010-12 are only one example of the impact 
that major grain producing and exporting states can have on global and domestic markets. 
                                                 
13 Hallam, David and Trade and Markets Division of FAO. The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 
2009. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (2009). http://www.fao.org/3/i0854e/i0854e.pdf 
14 Galpin, Richard, “Russia ban on grain exports begins,” BBC News, August 15, 2010. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-10977955 
15 Hendrix, Cullen S. and Stephan Haggard. "Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the 
developing world." Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 52, no. 2 (2015): 143-157. 
16 Bobenrieth, Eugenio S. and Brian D. Wright. (2009). The food price crisis of 2007/2008: Evidence and 
implications. Paper presented at the Joint Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group on Oilseeds, Oils and 
Fats (30th Session), the Intergovernmental Group on Grains (32nd Session) and the Intergovernmental 
Group on Rice (43rd Session), Santiago, Chile. 4–6 November 2009. 
https://are.berkeley.edu/~bwright/Wright/Publications_files/Panel_Discussion_paper_2_English_only-
2.pdf 
17 Götz, 215 
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Over the past decade, the balance of market share has shifted and, with it, so has the relative 
influence of each country’s policy decisions. As noted, one of the most marked shifts has 
come in Russia’s market capture. In 2018, Russia was the top exporter accounting for 21.1 
percent of total wheat exports. The next four top exporters are Canada accounting for 14.2 
percent of the global share, the United States at 13.6 percent, France at 10.3 percent, and 
Australia at 7.7 percent.18 The proximity of Russia’s production to its Black Sea ports 
provide advantaged positions to Middle East and North Africa markets that have absorbed 
Russia’s rapid increase in exports. Russia is already a leading wheat exporter in the region, 
which absorbs 80 percent of Russia’s exports, and continues to work toward a larger role 
in that market.19 Together, Egypt and Turkey account for approximately 40 percent of 
Russia’s exports though the exact balance fluctuates based on market dynamics and 
geopolitical circumstances.20 Along with Egypt and Turkey, other countries have switched 
to Russian wheat from their traditional suppliers in North America and the EU.21  
As Russia’s place in the global market grows and as its exports replace those of 
leading suppliers, the need to understand its motivations and potential policy decisions has 
become critical. Russia’s leverage in these recipient countries is growing, often to the 
detriment of other grain exporters that Russia may have displaced. Along with it, Russia’s 
capacity to impact trade flows at the expense or to the benefit of those import dependent 
countries is also growing. The covert expression of economic power through food exports 
                                                 
18 Workman, Daniel, “Wheat Exports by Country.” Wheat Top Exports, April 1, 2019. Accessed April 10, 
2019. http://www.worldstopexports.com/wheat-exports-country/ 
19 Ghada Ahmed, Sona Nahapetyan, Danny Hamrick, and Jonathan Morgan (2017), “Russian Wheat Value 
Chain and Global Food Security”, Duke Center on Globalization, Governance and Competitiveness, May 
2017; Global Agricultural Information Network. Russian Federation: Agricultural Economy and Policy 
Report. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Report No. RS1819. July 19, 2018. 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Economy%20and%20Policy%
20Report_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_7-19-2018.pdf 
20 Kingwell, Ross, Chris Carter, Peter Elliott, and Peter White. (2016). Russia’s Wheat Industry: 
Implications for Australia. Perth; Sydney: Australian Export Grain Innovation Centre. 
https://www.aegic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Russia-wheat-industry-Implications-for-
Australia.pdf 
21 Ahmed, 11.  
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acts as another avenue toward achieving Russia’s strategic aims and is integral to an 
understanding of the domestic and foreign policy stances of the country.  
WHY WHEAT? 
At the heart of this analysis is wheat. In general, cereals provide rich opportunity 
for analysis. Wheat and rice are major staple food crops and constitute 40 percent of human 
caloric intake globally. Other grains, such as corn and barley, are critical feed grains that 
support the livestock sector and directly compete with wheat production for land, capital 
and labor. Grains also represent a form of “virtual water”22 for countries that are water-
poor, such as Egypt. Cereals account for 15 percent of the global virtual water trade.23  
Wheat is traded across borders more than any other cereal, meaning that the 
connection between international price instability and domestic markets is strong. Wheat 
accounts for a quarter of global crop acreage and 60 percent of Russia’s grain crops. Both 
in Russia and its export markets, wheat is a main source of calories. Despite its massive 
exporting market, approximately 70 percent of Russian wheat is consumed domestically. 
Wheat markets are intimately connected to energy and financial markets, and wheat prices 
respond to higher energy prices as agricultural inputs, production, and transportation 
become more expensive, and currency fluctuations create ripple effects in the agricultural 
value chain and import and export markets. Demand for bread and other wheat products 
typically rises in response to economic downturn or lower incomes and decreases as 
incomes rise and a country experiences economic growth. Perhaps most important, bread 
enjoys an almost-religious sacredness from Russian consumers. In fact, all over the world, 
bread, simple and essential, is a central symbol in many cultures, religions, and countries. 
                                                 
22 Virtual water is the water that is used to produce a commodity that is accessible via trade. Keulertz, 
Martin and Eckart Woertz (2015) “States as Actors in International Agro-Investments.” Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions: Focus on South-East Asia, International Development Policy Series No.6, Geneva: Graduate 
Institute Publications, Boston: Brill-Nijhoff, pp. 30–52 
23 Sojamo, Suvi, Martin Keulertz, Jeroen Warner and John Anthony Allan. “Virtual Water Hegemony: The 
Role of Agribusiness in Global Water Governance.” Water International, Vol. 37, 2 (2012), 169–182, DOI: 
10.1080/02508060.2012.662734.  
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Altogether, wheat is politically, economically, and socially significant.24 Understanding 
wheat is valuable to understanding a country, its people, and its policies. 
  
                                                 
24 Keulertz, Martin and Eckart Woertz (2015) “States as Actors in International Agro-Investments” 
in Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: Focus on South-East Asia, International Development Policy series 
No.6, Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, Boston: Brill-Nijhoff, pp. 30–52 
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Chapter III: Observable Motivations of Russian Food Policy  
Food is an access-point for the government into citizens’ lives. As Hendrix explains, “food 
is an inherently political commodity, affected by subsidies, land policies and other 
government interventions.”25 The political facets of food carry significant sway in the 
policy development that do not always align with the economic considerations. Modern 
Russian food and agricultural policy is built on three main objectives: to increase domestic 
production, increase Russia’s share of global grain and food markets, and achieve greater 
domestic food security.26 The selection of these particular goals and the path to achieving 
them are influenced by a range of considerations that extend far beyond economic factors. 
The goals are all pieces of a greater strategy to establish Russian food independence and 
thus greater international power, at the same time that domestic political legitimacy is 
preserved. The protectionist policies employed in response to the 2007-2012 food price 
increases capture the integrated nature of these objectives and reveal the complex 
motivations behind them. In a 2009 report on agricultural export restrictions, the 
International Policy Council notes that export restrictions on raw commodities, like wheat, 
are “basically measures to protect consumers or to win their political support.”27  
Mobilization in the cities has always presented the greatest political threat to Russian 
leaders, a lesson learned in the 1917 Revolution. Since 1991, Russia’s population has been 
approximately 75 percent urban, inflating the importance of urban appeasement.28 In line 
with Hendrix and Haggard’s argument that autocrats are more incentivized to protect urban 
consumers than rural ones, the Kremlin is highly motivated to intervene to keep food prices 
                                                 
25 Hendrix, Cullen. 2015. “In Food Riots, Researchers Find a Divide Between Democracies and 
Autocracies.” New Security Beat, February 24, 2015. https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/02/food-riots-
researchers-find-divide-democracies-autocracies/ 
26 Wegren, Stephen K. “Russia’s Food Policies and Foreign Policy.” Demokratizatsiya Vol. 18, no. 3 
(2010), 189-207. http://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/18_3_C4W0VN8038PQR45P.pdf 
27 Mitra, 3.  
28The World Bank. Urban Population (% of total): Russian Federation. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision. Accessed April 
1, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=RU  
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low in cities.29 While the Russian story is certainly more complicated than that, the basic 
idea is that explicit motivations for policy actions are never as clear as they seem. 
FOOD SECURITY AS FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
Greater domestic food security is one of Russia’s primary agricultural development 
goals. Stephen Wegren notes that the term food security “has been a part of the [Russian] 
political discourse since the early 1990s.”30 This coincided with market reform under Boris 
Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation. During that decade, developments in 
the agricultural sector, including a decline in output and a transition to crops from livestock, 
interacted with general economic trends and a sharp shift toward market liberalization to 
raise concerns about food insecurity.31 Even as the economic situation improved and 
agricultural output and consumer purchasing power increased, political anxiety over food 
security remained, especially at higher strata of government. 
In 2010, the Kremlin presented the export ban as an effort to prevent domestic price 
increases by preserving domestic grain supplies for food staples and animal feed and 
rebuilding stocks for future years.32 President Medvedev explained that the government’s 
role is to “create conditions when the population of our country, people who live in our 
country, will be provided food at normal, reasonable prices.”33 In other words, the 
government intended to ensure bigger domestic grain supply at lower prices to ensure food 
security of its population. The same rationale applied to the 2008 taxes. But well before 
either food price crisis, in 2003, the FAO wrote, “Although ‘food security’ has been used 
as a justification for protectionist agricultural policies and support for producers, we found 
no evidence that such policies improved actual food security in the Russian Federation.”34 
                                                 
29 Hendrix, Cullen S., and Stephan Haggard. "Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the 
developing world." Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 2 (2015): 146. 
30 Wegren, Stephen K. "Food security and Russia's 2010 drought." Eurasian Geography and Economics, 
Vol. 52, no. 1 (2011): 140. 
31 Wegren (2011), 141.   
32 Wegren (2011).  
33 Wegren (2011), 142. 
34 Sedik, 93.  
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The discrepancy in the stated policy intention and the outcome is not because Russian 
officials are bad at conceptualizing or implementing food policy. Rather, the key to the 
inconsistency lies in semantics.  
In Russian political discourse, the “Russian variant of food security differs from 
common international usage,” wherein food security is defined as “a situation that exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life.”35 Food insecurity can result in the absence of any piece of this criteria. 
Russian food security discourse diverges from this and is not a straightforward concern 
with feeding its population. The country’s application of the food security concept is closer 
to food self-sufficiency: “the extent to which a country can satisfy its food needs from its 
domestic production.”36 The nearer a country comes to producing 100 percent or more of 
its consumption needs, the greater its food self-sufficiency ratio. Food security and food 
self-sufficiency do not necessarily support or enhance each other. Food self-sufficiency is 
concerned only with food that is produced domestically, not with the ability of its 
population to access, afford, and otherwise utilize that food. It is possible for a country’s 
self-sufficiency to increase at the same that its food security decreases.  
The 2010 Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation formalized this 
distinctive approach to food security. Signed on January 30, 2010 by President Dmitry 
Medvedev, the Doctrine conflates the titular food security with self-sufficiency: “Food 
security of the Russian Federation is the state of the country’s economy that ensures food 
independence of the Russian Federation, physical and economic availability of foodstuffs 
to every citizen. . .”37 By defining food security as a characteristic of the Russian 
                                                 
35 Vasilii, Erokhin, “Self-Sufficiency versus Security: How Trade Protectionism Challenges the 
Sustainability of the Food Supply in Russia”, Sustainability, Vol. 9, 11 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.3390/su9111939. 3; FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2018. The State of Food 
Security and Nutrition in the World 2018: Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. 
Rome, FAO (2018). http://www.fao.org/3/I9553EN/i9553en.pdf 
36 Vasilii, 2 
37 Vassilieve, Yelena and Mary Ellen Smith, Russian Federation: Food Security Doctrine Adopted. USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Information Network Report No. RS1008, February 11, 
2010. 
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Federation, the Doctrine operationalizes the concept as a national metric tied to domestic 
agricultural performance. One identified criterion to evaluate the level of food security is 
the share of total commodity resources met by domestic production. The document 
establishes minimum self-sufficiency targets for most food commodities, including a 95 
percent target for grain and potatoes. The country has exceeded the targets for grain, 
vegetable oil and potatoes every year since 2010, and has only failed to meet its domestic 
production target for milk and dairy, reaching only 80 percent of the 90 percent goal in 
2016.38 Achievement of these food self-sufficiency targets was made possible by a 
confluence of factors, which are discussed more in Chapter V.  
The conflation of food security and food self-sufficiency makes sense when 
returning to the three objectives of Russian food policy. Food security when applied as 
food self-sufficiency supports and interacts with the pursuit of the other two goals, greater 
domestic production and a greater share of global markets. President Medvedev explains 
that “Russia should in full measure use its unique agrarian potential, providing itself not 
only with basic types of food, but also. . . to become one of the leading exporters of food 
in the world.”39 Taken together, this troika constitutes a view of food and agricultural 
policy as a critical subset of Russian foreign policy.  Through the strategic achievement of 
its three food policy objectives, Russia seeks to turn its agricultural capacity into hard 
power.  
FOOD SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY 
By the time of the food price spikes in 2008, food security had already become an 
integral component of Russian security thinking. At the World Food Summit in 2008, then-
Minister of Agriculture Aleksei Gordeyev said: “Russia is very often perceived throughout 
the world as a major military power. . . At the same time, and perhaps above and beyond 
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anything else, Russia is a major agrarian power.”40 In January 2010, Minister of 
Agriculture Yelena Skrynnik argued that food security is “one of the central and prioritized 
problems in the system of national security.”41 Food policy—especially the pursuit of food 
self-sufficiency and import substitution—was not just an essential component of Russia’s 
global projection of power and a barrier to vulnerability; it was a precondition for it. Russia 
formalized the role of agricultural and food policy in Russia’s geopolitical strategy by tying 
the Food Security Doctrine directly to the National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation to 2020 (NSS). Adopted in May 2009, the NSS states that the “safeguarding of 
food security is ensured through”, among other things, “achieving food independence for 
the Russian Federation.”42 President Dmitry Medvedev was clear that the food security 
doctrine is “one of the means to realize the National Security Strategy to 2020,” and argued 
that, “supplying food products is one of the cornerstones of security in general.”43 The NSS 
explicitly states that dependence on food imports should be decreased with a corresponding 
increase in domestic production, or in other words, self-sufficiency should be increased, 
“to achieve economic independence and to strengthen the economic prowess of domestic 
producers.”44   
This notion is not a new one, but it is the first time that Russia has actually been 
positioned to see this policy position come to fruition. In 1970, Christian Science Monitor 
stated, “If Russia has a good harvest, its foreign policy will be bold and aggressive.”45 As 
Dronin and Bellinger note, the USSR’s large food imports and poor harvests throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s impacted the nature and scope of its foreign policy.46 The flip side of 
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this, which Moscow understands, is that greater self-reliance, by way of reduced imports 
and increased domestic production, grants Russia more leeway in the international arena. 
Russia has not only recovered from its agricultural slump in the 1990s but has accelerated 
production since the early 2000s and managed to produce surplus for export. This has 
alleviated domestic pressures and given Russia greater leverage internationally. In this 
way, Russia’s integrated food policy is a strategic component of its relations with the 
United States, the Middle East, the EU, and other countries. 
That Russia’s agriculture interests overlap significantly with its domestic and 
foreign aspirations and vulnerabilities is a fact that countries like the United States know 
well from the Cold War era. On January 4, 1980, President Carter attempted to exercise 
American power through food by imposing an embargo on U.S. grain to the Soviet Union 
as punishment for Soviet entrance into Afghanistan. The withheld grain, Carter stated, was 
“not intended for human consumption, but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock 
herds.”47 To abridge the story, the embargo, rather than hobble the Soviet Union, 
demonstrated that the USSR could and should survive without United States’ grain. Today, 
Russia’s agricultural sector is more productive than ever, and definitely more productive 
than in 1979 when it managed to produce only 48 million tons of wheat.48 In 2017/2018, 
wheat production reached a record 85 million tons, which far exceeded 43 MT of domestic 
consumption in 2017.49 This success has not been by accident alone. Though some is due 
to circumstance, such as good weather, a portion of the sustained growth is the result of the 
intentional pursuit of the three-pronged food policy focus with a larger foreign policy and 
security stance. 
Examined altogether, these cohesive motivations of Russian food and agricultural 
policy make sense, especially as a prerequisite for effective foreign policy and national 
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security. The following three sections dig into Russia’s history to understand why Russia 
is preoccupied with achieving self-sufficiency and increasing agricultural production, as 
well as why food policy falls neatly into place under a national security and foreign policy 
umbrella. The contemporary economic and political environment exists within a historical 
framework that impacts what policies and priorities are rational for the government to 
pursue. The political, social, and cultural food history of the Russian state limit, sway, and 
otherwise shape the way that the Russian Federation prioritizes and makes domestic and 
foreign food policy today.  
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Chapter IV: Agriculture: The Soviet Union’s Blessing and Burden 
After the Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian Tsar in 1917, the Russian Empire 
became the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, a one-party state led by 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) under the tutelage of Vladimir Ilyich 
Ulyanov (“Lenin”). After two revolutions and a five-year civil war, the Bolsheviks 
inherited a diverse empire and were tasked with uniting it. The long-term survival of the 
USSR required a gravitational force to hold it together. The initial international aspect of 
the CPSU that promised a universal communist society was abandoned, and Stalin and 
other leaders began to focus on perfecting a socialist society within the USSR first. Soviet 
leaders fostered a strand of patriotism that could support the state’s ambitions to abolish 
capitalism and become a great power. The idea of the nation-state was replaced with the 
Communist state because “the nation was inextricably connected with a mighty state; 
indeed, the state was the expression of the nation.”50 The philosophy of nation as state had 
lasting implications for the internal structure of the USSR. Soviet communism promoted 
the preeminence of the state and situated the individuals within it as secondary.51 The 
elevation of State interests over those of society is exemplified in Soviet food and 
agricultural policy, which consistently subordinated the needs and realities of its population 
to communist ideals. The empire’s vast lands always seemed to hold the key to Russia’s 
supremacy, but communism was unable to unlock it. Soviet leaders treated agriculture as 
the cornerstone that would support the communist state. When it proved feeble, the whole 
structure swayed, yet they failed to chart a new course. 
FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS ENDURING BLEMISH 
The legitimacy of the Soviet Union depended on its viability as an alternative to the 
capitalist system. Domestically, the USSR had to demonstrate its ability to achieve a certain 
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material standard of living. But this was only part of the equation and then only indirectly. 
More importantly, the Soviet Union, already lagging behind the United States after WWI, 
had to remake itself as a global economic dynamo where the measure of success was 
production, not consumption. The pathway to this was industrialization, the central tenet 
of communist economic change.52 Industrialization required a mass transformation of 
peasants into workers, and workers required food. Fatefully, more workers in the city 
meant more mouths to feed but fewer people to produce food. Despite the early worker-
peasant alliance in the Bolshevik Revolution, the long-term interests of rural and urban 
populations were not necessarily aligned. As the communist agenda took shape, the rural 
population withdrew its support.  
When Stalin, an unwavering devotee to the Communist ideology, looked at the 
pieces before him, he decided on intense collectivization.53 Part of the first Five-Year Plan 
(1928-1932), collectivization was the forced consolidation of peasant farms into large 
collective farms. In the name of production and extraction efficiency, control over land and 
food production was centralized in the state. State-owned collective farms, sovkhozy, 
existed alongside kolkhozy, nominally cooperative farms that were very similar to 
sovkhozy, except in the level of state support they received. Collectivization was a political 
and economic endeavor meant to fuel industrialization and rapidly transform the Soviet 
Union into a modern power through resource extraction and exploitation of peasants. The 
policy was a reversal of Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) in place from 1922 to 1927. 
NEP was “first of all a new agricultural policy” that introduced free market principles to 
farming to incentivize peasants and increase productivity.54 In Stalin’s view, NEP violated 
communist principles and created a dangerous new class of wealthy peasants, the kulaks, 
who benefitted from the low-level capitalism that NEP allowed.55 When grain production 
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dropped dramatically in 1927-28, Stalin and other critics seized the opportunity to 
dismantle NEP and replace it with collectivization. 
During collectivization, no one was above the primacy of state interests, but Stalin-
era policies were always as anti-peasant as they were pro-communism. Collectivization 
meant the systematic food deprivation of peasants in order to feed industrialization. Stalin 
expropriated as much grain as necessary for transport to the cities even if it left peasants 
completely without.56 Any increase in farm yields was met with increased quotas, keeping 
the peasants in a constant state of shortage. When total output of collective farms failed to 
reach expectations, grain for cities was still seized from the productive regions, leaving 
those who produced the food to starve. The deprived peasants, not the state or even the 
capricious climate, were blamed for their own misery. 
Under collectivization, peasants lost their agency, traditions, and possessions, along 
with their reason and will to work. They were forced to collectivize or were imprisoned for 
resisting. The peasant household, as a social unit, was replaced by the collective farm. 
“They were forced to accept a special legal status, including controls on their movement: 
all collective farmers, kolkhozniks, would eventually need to seek permission to work 
outside the village.”57 An internal passport system developed in 1932 ensured against rural 
migration to cities in search of food by expressly forbidding peasants from obtaining 
passports. This system lasted into the 1970s. Peasants were also excluded from the ration 
card system. Stalin combined collectivization with a de-kulakization program intended to 
‘liquidate the kulaks.’ During the first five years of Stalin’s rule, these policies actively 
contributed to the severe hunger or starvation of nearly 40 million people and the deaths of 
between 5 and 7 million people.58 If rural dwellers survived the first of Stalin’s Five-Year 
Plans, “they could only try to make the best of things under the new order”.59 By 
stigmatizing them, limiting their mobility, taking their possessions, and creating an 
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atmosphere of distrust and fear among neighbors, the rural population’s early aspirations 
after the Revolution were truncated.   
Such ruthless rural programs were not without consequence. As Lenin found out 
under the 1918 war communism policy and Stalin also learned, peasants would simply stop 
producing and even sabotage their land and animals. Peasants’ refusal to produce food had 
dangerous implications for the regime, as it stressed the state’s capacity to uphold its 
contract with the rest of the population and increased its reliance on external support. Thus, 
it became a central policy priority for post-Stalin leaders to figure out how to coax higher 
production out of the countryside. The enduring agriculture problem showed force to be an 
insufficient mechanism for state control and effectiveness in the countryside. 
While agricultural policy had always been a piece of Russia’s great power equation, 
collectivization forever enlarged its role. The fate of agriculture became inseparable from 
the fate of the Soviet Union. As Stalin said in a 1928 visit to Siberia: “The grain problem 
is part of the agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is an integral part of the 
problem of building socialism in our country.” Unlike NEP, however, once collectivization 
took hold, it could not be undone by a reversal in policy. In the decades following Stalin’s 
rule, the institutions that he created –“state and collective farms, the absence of private land 
ownership, state-dominated procurement and distribution systems, obligatory food 
deliveries, state-controlled pricing, the lack of a wholesale market, state processing 
monopolies, and state-directed resource allocation”—continued to dominate and restrict 
the policy options of future leaders.60 However, this intransigence did not lead to 
consistency in agriculture policy. In 1932, Vladimir Timoshenko wrote presciently: “The 
conflict between the necessity of developing the productive forces of agriculture on the one 
hand, and the communist political theory and necessity on the other, gave rise to continued 
vacillation in the agricultural policy, particularly after 1925.”61 Those words have remained 
remarkably true through the eight decades since their writing.  
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KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV: BETWEEN COLLECTIVIZATION AND PERESTROIKA 
Yuri Levada, a Russian sociologist and political scientist, suggests that “Soviet 
society moved, pendulum-like, between periods of extreme oppression and relative 
liberalization, as under Khrushchev and early on under Gorbachev [but] in the long run, 
the cycles ensured the stability of the regime.”62 Agricultural and food policy in the Soviet 
Union epitomize these swings. In the same way that collectivization was Stalin’s response 
to Lenin’s NEP, each subsequent leader responded to the agricultural policies of the man 
before him, albeit only in-so-far as the constraints of the communist system allowed. 
Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the USSR from 1953 to 1964, responded to 
collectivization with the Virgin Lands Campaign, a plan to bring 32 million acres of idle 
and virgin land into production, even if those areas had unfavorable climate and soil.63 
Khrushchev also consolidated collectivized farms in search of greater efficiency. During 
his tenure, the number of kolkhozes dropped from 125,000 to 36,000 giant agricultural 
producing units or ‘agrotowns’ as Khrushchev imagined them. Khrushchev’s tendency 
toward arrogance and exploitation betrayed the early gains of his agricultural policy, 
epitomized in his attempts to expand acreage planted with corn for livestock fodder in lands 
unsuitable for the task based on the American model of industrial agriculture. The 
campaign culminated in the food crisis of 1960-63 with a grain deficit of 40 million tons, 
panicked slaughtering of livestock, and a run on bread in the cities. Facing a critical grain 
imbalance, Khrushchev did not take the standard approach of using food rations to close 
the gap. Instead, he chose to purchase foreign grain from western countries, a suspected 
provocation for his removal the following year. Despite these failures, Khrushchev did 
achieve widespread industrialization of Soviet agriculture that would contribute to future 
productivity.  
Though Khrushchev was less hostile to rural populations than Stalin, producers 
continued to bear the brunt of harsh agricultural production and expropriation policies. The 
ascension of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) marked a shift in the state’s burden-sharing 
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with agricultural producers. Brezhnev recognized that “the social cost would be too high if 
food problems were again solved at the expense of the farmers.”64 In 1965, the state 
adopted the convergence of city and countryside as an explicit policy goal.65 The state 
established guaranteed incomes, pensions and other social protections for farmers, eased 
grain quotas, and raised procurement prices. State spending on agriculture expanded to 18 
percent of the budget, compared to America’s five percent, and included monthly wages 
for kolkhozniks.66 In the 1970s, Brezhnev also ended the system that expressly forbid 
peasants from obtaining passports. Freedom of movement had enormous implications for 
the rural and urban dynamics, as people flocked to the cities and left rural areas sparsely 
populated. Brezhnev continued Khrushchev’s amalgamation of farms into larger, vertically 
integrated complexes, but shifted from a focus on expansion of crop area to intensification. 
This was accomplished through increased capital investment, mechanization, and use of 
fertilizer and other technologies. In trying to alleviate state pressure on producers, 
Brezhnev’s policies made agriculture more state dependent than ever. By 1975, ten years 
into Brezhnev’s tenure, agricultural product subsidies totaled “17.2 billion rubles, equal to 
15 percent of annual retail food purchases.”67  
Brezhnev tenure would have lasting effects on the trajectory of Russia agricultural 
production for another reason. During the 1970s, he elevated the livestock sector’s place 
in Russia’s political economy of food production. After Khrushchev’s corn campaign 
failed to solve the country’s livestock problem, Brezhnev established large-scale modern 
breeding complexes and tried to apply the same principles of intensification and 
modernization of farming to livestock. The ambition was to raise consumer welfare by 
increasing consumption of animal products. In a departure from the typical focus on 
production, Soviet planners sought to achieve the “rational norm” of meat consumption per 
year, set by the state at 70kg. Meat shortages were a persistent irritation to both consumers 
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and politicians, “unpleasant reminders of the failings of a political ideal.”68 But increased 
domestic livestock production was a zero-sum game. More grain for livestock meant less 
grain for bread. Even when livestock production gains were achieved, prices stayed high, 
and large quantities of meat were still imported. Reliance on grain imports from other 
countries was at odds with the Soviet Union’s goal of a complete and sufficient socialist 
state, but there was no way around it. The state could either produce its own meat or its 
own wheat; it could not do both. This tension meant that the state had to import “36 million 
tonnes [of grain] per year in the 1980s,” up from almost zero in 1970.”69 From 1986 to 
1990, the USSR imported an annual average of 32.2 million tons of grain or 14 percent of 
total consumption, largely to support the ambitious livestock program.70 The emphasis on 
livestock production—and the tradeoffs that entails—remains at the center of Russian food 
policy today.   
Because of agriculture’s centrality to the success of the USSR, the state was willing 
to pour seemingly endless money into the sector, but production output was not growing 
commensurate with investment. From 1961 to 1977, each extra ruble of agricultural capital 
stock added only a third of a ruble to output, down from half a ruble in 1951 to 1960.71 In 
the decade from 1976 to 1985, the picture was even grimmer; despite $150 billion invested 
in agriculture, the production increase was zero.72 Massive subsidies and heavy-handed 
price controls distorted the sector and weighed down the state, but any attempts to reform 
caused negative and magnified waves throughout the industry. Worst of all, system failures 
had led to Soviet dependence on the West through food aid, grain imports, machinery, 
fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. By the late 1980s, the USSR’s economic muscle 
was hollowed out. Its only claim to super power status was its nuclear capacity.  
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SUPPLEMENTING STATE SHORTAGES 
Because the state was unable to meet the Russian population’s basic needs and 
changing consumption demands, the USSR had to supplement its own supply with both 
external and internal resources. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet 
Union maintained a trade relationship on basic commodities as the latter regularly suffered 
shortfalls due to failed crops and incompetent agricultural policies. Khrushchev’s scorned 
receipt of food aid in 1963 was not the first nor the last time that the country would receive 
significant assistance from western countries. By the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union was 
reliant on western grain, particularly from the United States, a relationship that was 
formalized in the 1975 Long-term Grain Agreement. In 1972, in an incident that became 
known as the ‘great grain robbery’, the Soviet Union bought a quarter of the US wheat 
harvest at subsidized prices to supplement the USSR’s own grain failure. The purchase 
emptied out U.S. wheat supply and caused global commodity prices and U.S. consumer 
prices to skyrocket. The incident demonstrated the potential for a profitable and mutually 
beneficial arrangement between the two countries, but also exposed the vulnerabilities that 
such a relationship could produce in a globalizing market.  
This was the food dependency that the United States attempted to exploit with the 
1980 grain embargo, which again revealed the complex and intertwined interests of the 
major powers. In response to the embargo, Brezhnev announced an ambitious Food 
Program in 1981 to reduce reliance on farm product imports from capitalist countries. A 
1982 CIA Intelligence Assessment describes the program as “essentially a continuation of 
past policies” with production goals that are “untenable both because of the political and 
bureaucratic conflicts inherent in the program and because of its failure to come to grips 
with more fundamental problems.”73 The Soviet Union remained committed to its livestock 
program and also its burdensome approach to centrally controlling agriculture at every 
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stage. And so, from President Herbert Hoover’s assistance during the 1921 famine to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USSR would have to rely on outside help. 
To close the gap between supply and demand, the state found itself also reliant on 
resourceful urban and rural populations within its own borders. Soviet officials showed 
themselves willing to turn a blind eye to food production and consumption that occurred 
outside of the centrally-controlled system. Bialer explains that “deviant economic 
behavior” was less dangerous than deviant political behavior. Allowing Soviets to channel 
their activities into sub-market economic aspirations “to some extent performs the function 
of a safety valve for the pent-up dissatisfaction of broad strata of Soviet society.”74 For this 
reason, the sub-economy that emerged was integral to the survival of the primary state 
system. Soviet officials were aware of and tolerant of these subversive activities because 
knew that the existence of private or informal economic activities moderates what might 
otherwise be rebellious inclinations.  
Throughout the USSR’s existence, collectivized peasants maintained private plots 
that contributed more than thirty percent of total agricultural output. In 1966, out of the 
USSR’s total gross production, these private producers contributed 64 percent of potatoes, 
43 percent of vegetables, 40 percent of meat, 39 percent of milk, and 66 percent of eggs. 75 
Eighty percent of this production was consumed by the producer family itself, and the 
remaining 20 percent was sold in private markets.76 City dwellers found other ways around 
the insufficient food provided by the state, including dachas and subsistence plots, and 
bartering with rural populations. Despite the risk, private markets flourished. These 
markets were points of exchange between rural and urban populations, where peasants sold 
their food to the city in exchange for material and consumer goods. This second economy 
system produced the illusion, and sometimes even the reality, of higher living standards 
and material wealth than the state could provide of its own capacity. 
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The informal food system was still thriving during the tenure of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union. In a June 1990 article, journalist Richard 
Parker describes a meal he had with friends in Moscow. The extravagant meal came not 
from the empty grocery store, but from the hosts’ dacha garden, a private market, an 
enterprising neighbor who sold baked goods on the side, and through bartering. The host 
continues, “We Russians have a saying: To, schro ne videsh v magazinakh, videsh na stok. 
What you don't find in the store, you find in the home."77  
RESTRUCTURING, OPENNESS AND THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) became the general secretary of the CPSU after 
the quick terms of General Secretaries Yuri Andropov (November 1982 – February 1984) 
and Konstantin Chernenko (February 1984 – March 1985). By the time Gorbachev took 
office, it was clear that agriculture was the millstone weighing down the sagging Soviet 
economy. The Soviet Union was isolated from and lagging behind the capitalist world. The 
ideology that had devised collectivization was proving no match for the capitalist farming 
systems elsewhere. Years of confused agricultural policies had layered on thick 
bureaucracy and inefficiencies. Living standards, productivity, and technological 
advancement had stagnated. The USSR was at a breaking point.  
Gorbachev, born in 1931, grew up in Stavropol Krai, a town devastated by 
collectivization. The newest leader of the Soviet Union was a man who had encountered 
first-hand its harshest policy interventions. Gorbachev pursued a career in agriculture, 
attending Stavropol State Agricultural Academy, before being appointed in 1978 as the 
secretary for agriculture in the Central Committee. As leader of the Soviet Union, 
Gorbachev was the first to propose structural reforms to the entrenched agricultural system. 
With training and professional experience in agriculture, he was well-acquainted with the 
inefficiencies of collectivized agriculture. The agricultural sector was the most logical 
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starting place to inject market incentives and decision-making power back into the system. 
Gorbachev sought to elevate small and individual family farms through an “autonomous 
link” system that paid based on output, not work. Thus, individual farms could be run more 
like private businesses with incentives directly linked to efficiency and performance. 
Throughout Soviet history, autonomous links had been tried intermittently but had been 
routinely suppressed by the country’s bureaucracy. Despite its clashes with Soviet ideology 
and power structures, Gorbachev pursued it as a critical piece of Soviet recovery. But, he 
found, small change was not possible with the agro-industrial system, rigid with political 
power of those who managed collective farms and cumbersome communist ideology. He 
was frustrated at every turn. In 1987, Gorbachev said: “There is something that prevents 
us from moving forward. . .We have passed more than sixty decrees on agriculture since 
April 1985.” 78 And yet change did not come, both because the people did not buy into it 
and because the bureaucracy in charge of implementing the decrees would not allow it.  
Because of this, Gorbachev had to make his agricultural reforms part of a more 
systemic push to address corruption, inefficiencies, and redundancies. In 1985, General 
Secretary Gorbachev promoted political and economic liberalization through dual policies 
of perestroika and glasnost. In doing so, he hoped to reestablish the legitimacy of the 
communist state, not dismantle it. Perestroika, “restructuring,” intended to reform the 
Soviet economy. His vision was an economy built on market mechanisms, consumer 
goods, and global economic integration, and otherwise diminished artificial borders. In 
many ways, perestroika did not just fail to save the Soviet Union from its economic woes; 
it made the situation worse. The economy floundered between the old command economy 
and the new liberalized one.79 While revenues and export earnings fell and inflation grew, 
price controls and subsidies remained in place. The budget deficit reached crisis levels. 
Endemic inefficiencies and corruption in Soviet agriculture and industry exacerbated the 
discrepancy. Standard of living backslid, food became scarcer, and rationing was 
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intensified in part because Soviet subsidies made food vastly underpriced and thus created 
excess demands. At the end of 1988, “meat was rationed in twenty-six out of fifty-five 
regions of the RSFSR.”80 One year later, “milk, tea, coffee, soap and meat had vanished 
from state retail outlets even in Moscow.”81 Soviet authorities and society were not 
interested in waiting for the reforms to prove their worth. Feeling the pressure, the elites 
and the party-state that benefited from the old system dug in. Gorbachev could not back 
pedal or move forward, so he too dug in. Eventually, in 1991, he was forced to resign.  
The second of Gorbachev’s policies was more difficult to contain once it began. 
Glasnost, meaning openness, encouraged transparency of state operations, reduced 
corruption and censorship, and allowed political discourse and criticism of the government. 
Gorbachev also began to speak of universal human rights and values, freedom of 
movement, civil rights, and renunciation of force. In time, he also welcomed a reevaluation 
of the country’s past and its Stalinist history. While the movement of information, truth 
and even people into and out of the Soviet Union had been increasing since the 1960s and 
had never been obstructed fully, Gorbachev’s policies accelerated the pace and offered 
state approval and protection. All of this entailed a flood of material flowing more 
unencumbered than ever before about the operation and condition of the Soviet state and 
its past deeds, surprising even party officials and Gorbachev himself with the reality.82 The 
Glasnost period taught the Russia population not only of its own misery, but also the state’s 
role in creating it. It invited society to reevaluate the way it understood its relationship to 
the state.  
Either policy, perestroika or glasnost, on its own may not have been so powerful. 
However, the simultaneous attempts to liberalize and democratize the countries gained 
momentum that exceeded Gorbachev’s efforts to control it. The social and political impacts 
of Glasnost made the failures of perestroika explosive. As Goldman argued: “The lifting 
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of strict political controls after seventy years of often ruthless enforcement was bound to 
cause excesses.”83 He goes on to explain the magnitude of these reforms:  
For that matter, any changes that might have broken the implicit social contract 
between the state and the general population would have been considered 
provocative. Although there was no formal document spelling out the rights and 
obligations, beginning in the late 1920s the Soviet public had gradually come to 
accept the idea that in exchange for full employment and little or no inflation, they 
would put up with a shortage of consumer goods and an overzealous police state. 
Anyone threatening that order had better not be only ambitious and self-confident 
but willing to risk the viability of the contract itself. (Goldman, 68) 
What Gorbachev was doing went beyond reform. He was rewriting the social 
contract between the Soviet state and society, and in the process, it shattered. The Russian 
people had never known anything but authoritarian rule, and their expectations for the 
social contract were relative to their own experience.84 When Gorbachev’s policies began, 
Soviet citizens witnessed their situation deteriorating. A New York Times article the day 
after Gorbachev resigned as USSR president puts it this way: “Mr. Gorbachev had given 
people a new freedom. But the Soviet Union had also given them something tangible—the 
pride of superpower. . . Now that was being taken away, too, and how the humiliation 
would play out, especially in conditions of hunger and poverty, was among the troubling 
questions for the future.”85 Greater freedom and openness also meant greater insecurity and 
uncertainty about the USSR’s place in the world. His frustrated attempts at agricultural 
reform were just a microcosm of how the system would react to more substantive changes. 
It is no surprise that a man who made agriculture his expertise rose to lead the USSR at the 
age of 49; nor is it a surprise that his devotion to communist ideology and the entrenched 
policies and ideologies of the past got in the way of true success.  
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BREAKING DOWN AND REBUILDING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
A 2005 survey found that 42 percent of Russians “wanted the return of a ‘leader 
like Stalin.’” The rate rises to 60 percent for citizens over the age of 60, who would have 
been at least seven years old when Stalin died.86 As Figes explains, the nostalgia for Stalin 
is not political or ideological. It is a longing for “the legendary period of their youth when 
the shops were full of goods, when there was social order and security, when their lives 
were organized and given meaning by the simple goals of the Five-Year Plans.”87 During 
Stalin’s totalitarian regime, society tolerated to some degree the oppressive regime because 
Stalin managed to industrialize and modernize the country, educate them, win World War 
II, raise urban standards of living, and lower the price of bread. 88 But even his totalitarian 
regime was susceptible to the pressure from the populace. At a July 1928 meeting of 
Bolshevik leaders, Anastas Mikoyan, Minister of Foreign Trade throughout Stalin’s reign, 
said, “We made the Revolution in order to eat more than just black bread. . . Even the fact 
that we began to sell grey bread provoked dissatisfaction among the workers.”89 Having 
given up so much to the communist state, the population did not expect to be poorly fed. 
Unfortunately, communism made the state’s guarantees difficult to uphold. Thus, of 
course, Stalin compensated with coercion where voluntary compliance was low.   
When Stalin died, Khrushchev began to soften the regime’s hard approach to 
authority and legitimacy, a process that Brezhnev continued. Certainly, both retained 
repressive approaches and did not seek open and democratic governance, but each 
attempted to revise the harshest of Stalin’s policies. If the USSR was going to become a 
modern nation-state on equal or superior ground to the Western world, legitimacy had to 
be built on more than intimidation. Each time the price of food was raised, meat 
disappeared from the shops, or rationing was reinstated, society saw itself as worse off than 
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before, a sentiment that threatened popular support. Thus, Gorbachev’s radical reforms 
themselves did not induce discontent from the Soviet population. But when the effects of 
the reform impacted their consumption, he had gone too far.  
Perestroika took away social protections, such as food subsidies and price controls, 
at the same time that Glasnost took away the state’s tools for forcing compliance. A letter 
from a Soviet student in February 1991, ten months before the USSR dissolved, says this: 
“Last week I was standing in a terrible line for meat. . . We had lines (as you know) but 
they were not so big, and we stood in those lines not for everything. But now we have lines 
for everything.”90 In 1991, as always, Russian society interacted with the state through 
food. Food transformed the success or failures of communism into a consumable object 
and allowed Soviet citizens to assess both the state’s adherence to its contract and the 
legitimacy of its leaders. The difference under Gorbachev’s reforms was that coercion was 
less permissible and the monopoly on information less complete. After Gorbachev, the 
legitimacy of the state seemed to depend more than ever on the ability to actually uphold 
the social contract.  
The authors of a 2005 report, Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia, 
1900-1990, summarize an inherent flaw in Russian agriculture: “As with any farming in 
marginal climate conditions, Russian agriculture should have been developing according 
to a ‘survivor’ rather than an ‘advancer’ model. . . for the former, success means being able 
to reproduce the basic living cycle, while the latter aims to raise the standard of living.”91 
The state chose advancement. The communist ideology made industrialization an 
immediate priority ahead of agriculture’s sustainable development, and Stalin ignored the 
hand that Russia’s unstable and adverse climatic conditions dealt, believing that 
communism would emancipate the land. Soviet leaders were determined to situate Russia 
as a modern power and a legitimate alternative to capitalism, and agrarian power became 
key to that positioning. In the end, the great ambitions of the socialist state would 
themselves undermine their achievement. Ironically, when trying to overcome these 
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dysfunctions, Gorbachev would only undermine the basis for the Soviet Union’s existence. 
Stalin’s policies and programs and those that his successors layered upon them were so 
entrenched that not even radical reform or dissolution of the USSR could erase the canvas. 
Russian leaders and policymakers must still contend with these legacies when crafting food 
and agricultural policy today. 
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Chapter V: Russia’s Leaders and the Sisyphean Agricultural Problem 
Throughout its history, the Soviet state held agriculture and food completely under 
its purview. The state penetrated society, dictating work, where they lived, and what they 
believed; it also controlled what it ate through state-standardized recipes, where it ate (in 
communal kitchens and public canteens), and how much it ate. In exchange for such 
intrusion, society expected the state to deliver a certain level of welfare. The uneven 
relationship persevered through purges, famine, hot and cold wars, and other trauma 
because of the power of the strong leader. From Stalin to Gorbachev, each leader embodied 
and used the state’s historical narrative and its ambitions to solidify his power. All ideas 
and actions were conveyed from his office with few checks on power, and he, whoever he 
is, positioned himself as the sole guarantor of the state’s geopolitical position. In doing so, 
he also left himself without a scapegoat when the situation turned sour. His power is also 
his vulnerability. Once Communist leaders made food and agriculture a proxy for 
understanding the overall system’s strength, the connection between political power and 
food was fixed. The Soviet Union’s collapse did not wipe the slate clean. Robert Service 
explains that any new leader of the Russian Federation would have to accept the durability 
of the Soviet order: “The sediment of various stages of history lay upon the Russian mind. 
. . no reforming regime could expect simply to turn Russia back on to a path of development 
abandoned in 1917.”92 The next leader would have to prioritize food policy if he was going 
to maintain stability while ushering in capitalism and prosperity.  
THE TRANSITION: YELTSIN AND THE MARKET ECONOMY 
By 1990, the year before the USSR dissolved, Soviet agriculture was a bloated 
system of irrational pricing, inefficiency, low producer incentives, waste and corruption. 
When Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union dissolved on December 25, 1991, Boris 
Yeltsin (1991-1999) assumed the presidency of the Russian Federation along with the 
responsibility to transition Russia from a communist economy to a capitalist one. Soon 
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after, he began an economic “shock therapy” program and began to contend with this long 
history. While this led to seemingly significant changes in Russia’s agricultural and food 
policy, “in certain respects Russian agriculture during transition has been marked more by 
continuity than change.”93 This section examines both the changes and continuities that 
have made Russia’s rise to a major wheat exporter possible and preserved some 
fundamental pieces of its agricultural problem. 
Yeltsin’s primary agricultural goals of transition were to achieve stable productivity 
alongside a reduction in the fiscal burden of agriculture on the state. This entailed cutting 
producer and consumer subsidies and price supports simultaneously. Free-market prices 
were introduced for consumer goods, and state price fixing was ended as initial steps in a 
longer process to privatize the entire economy. The policies had immediate consequences. 
Retail food prices rose “2,670 percent in 1992, 940 percent in 1993, and 330 in 1994.”94 
For decades, to uphold the communist myth, the Soviet Union had heavily subsidized the 
price of retail and wholesale food, elevating demand for products that were priced well 
below what market price would have been. As subsidies for farmers and producers 
disappeared, large scale production levels fell steeply too: “From 1991 to 2000, Russian 
agricultural output dropped by almost two-fifths, while production of livestock products 
was cut in half.”95 While painful, this contraction, which lasted until 1999, represented a 
necessary rebalancing in production and consumption volumes after decades of 
distortionary policies were removed.  
This decade of decline—or adjustment—compelled an increase in food imports, 
primarily cheap poultry from the United States, along with livestock products. For five of 
the years from 1990 to 2000, Russia received food aid from the United States and the 
European Union. Aid peaked in 1999 after a financial crisis hit Russia in late 1998. During 
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this time, food security language entered the political vernacular in Russia.96 The 
population began to fear the deeper welfare losses that the economic reforms would bring. 
Old strategies of personal commerce resurged; rural and urban populations alike began 
producing food on private plots and dachas, bartering, hoarding and trading in informal 
markets.97 At the end of the first decade of the transition, private plots accounted for over 
half of the country’s total agricultural output.  
In addition to price liberalization, privatization—the transfer of land to private 
individuals and companies—was a critical piece of the transition to market-based 
agriculture. However, the attempt to privatize was incomplete and superficial. Changes in 
ownership and production were mostly nominal. Because privatization was not coupled 
with institutional reform that clarified or enforced ownership and property rights, 
smallholders and individuals were often precluded from obtaining and owning land. In 
1990 there were around 25,000 “collective” farms. By 2003, most of Russia’s 221 million 
hectares of farmland was still “controlled by Soviet-era collective farms: inefficient, debt-
laden behemoths struggling to survive.”98 These farms averaging 4,800 hectares, or 11,861 
acres, in size were owned by managers “who are holdovers from communism” with strong 
financial interest in preventing further division.99 The Soviet era firmly consolidated 
political and economic interests, who were then able to lobby and otherwise pressure 
Yeltsin’s team to keep their interests in mind. This, combined with the fact that 
implementation of agrarian reform often fell to local and regional bureaucracy that often 
stood to lose from reforms, stunted the intended effects of privatization. 
Despite moves to privatize and liberalize, state support for the agricultural sector 
continued in many ways. The state retained control over areas of the agricultural value 
chain besides farmland, such as transportation and distribution, bailed out failing farms, 
gave tax breaks to producers, and otherwise afforded preferential treatment to collectivized 
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farmers. These domestic supports were complemented by trade policy that promoted 
Russian commodities and made them more competitive on the global market, such as tariff 
rate quotas and sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions (SPS) on meat imports, policies that 
continue today.  
Even with this support, investment in agriculture during Yeltsin’s tenure declined 
from $39 billion in 1990 to $2 billion in 2000. Farm debt rose as profitability dropped 
because producers could not afford inputs, machinery repairs or updates, infrastructure 
improvements, or management and operations enhancements. The loss of investment, 
combined with inflation, ruble fluctuation, and rising staple food prices, was too much to 
overcome. Thus, Yeltsin’s tenure had another critical impact: it paved the way for the next 
leader to reverse his withdrawal from agriculture. 
PUTIN’S FIRST TWO TERMS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE 
Market reform was never expected to be easy and in fact had made some progress 
in transitioning from the communist economy. However, the state failed to prepare the 
population generally and the agricultural sector specifically for an effective transition to 
capitalism. Yeltsin’s initial shock therapy and subsequent withdrawal left Russians and the 
Russian economy wanting. In 2000, Vladimir Putin assumed power with agrarian reform 
as a high priority. This entailed a reversion to market intervention and government support 
for the sector, not a refinement of free market principles. Post-1998 economic recession, 
Putin was able to take advantage of high energy prices that provided the government with 
much needed revenue to implement major reforms and inject money back into the 
agricultural sector. 
In July 2000, at the beginning of Putin’s first term, Minister of Agriculture Aleksei 
Gordeyev released the “Basic Directions of Agrofood Policy to 2010” document that set 
agricultural policy priority as “increasing domestic food production and lowering reliance 
on food imports, with the goal of improving the nation’s food security in particular and 
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economic security in general.”100 Wegren notes that the policy prescriptions in the 
document were actually pursued, saying that the “document was much more than rhetoric 
(unlike during the Yel’tsin administration).”101 Whereas Yeltsin had regularly failed to 
meet the state’s promised allocations to the agricultural and food sectors, Putin 
demonstrated a commitment to fulfilling these obligations both in policy and in action. In 
2000, Putin created Rosselkhozbank, a state-owned agricultural bank, that grants loans to 
producers at rates subsidized by the government. In 2002, Putin signed a law that provided 
financial relief to large farms whose debt kept them from making investments, paying 
workers, and maintaining labor. Both actions finally gave farms the ability to access loans 
and credit, invest in capital improvements, and increase production. Other facets of Putin’s 
agricultural policy included the simplification of the agricultural tax, introduction of a price 
support system for grain crops, direct production subsidies for animal products, a 
government-run program that lends machinery and livestock to farmers at subsidized rates, 
and state subsidization of fertilizer purchases.102  From 2005 to 2010, state support for 
agriculture tripled.103 
Agricultural production began to rebound. From 1998 to 2013, “total agricultural 
output in Russia increased by about 50 percent.”104 From 2000 when Putin took power to 
2008 when food price spike hit, wheat production increased from 34.5 to 63.8 million tons, 
a 54 percent increase.105 Agricultural enterprises (former state and collective farms) were 
the main recipients of Putin’s attention. They received support in a variety of forms, 
including tax breaks, trade restrictions, debt relief, subsidized credit, and purchase price 
supports. The government also supported them indirectly through third parties that provide 
subsidized equipment, loans, and other supports at rates subsidized by the government. 
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Fixed capital investment and foreign direct investment in the sector has also 
increased many times over from 2000 to 2015. The influx of capital led to the emergence 
of new agricultural operators, firms that own and manage massive vertically integrated 
farming operations in Russia. These operators have overcome persistent hurdles in Russian 
agriculture through significant investments in machinery, inputs, and technological 
advancements, specialization, and operational and managerial improvements.106 Opinion 
is mixed on whether NAOs represent the best approach to efficient and sustainable 
production; nonetheless their influence has grown and altered the landscape of Russian 
agriculture. Overall, larger enterprises have experienced a consolidation of economic and 
political power, along with an accumulation of capital and land.  
The other two types of producers in Russia today–household plots and private 
family farms—are finding their formal market presence and political power diminished. 
From 1990 to 2013, agricultural land used for household plots increased from 3 percent to 
16-20 percent.107 Altogether, smallholders only produce approximately one percent of the 
state’s grain, but account for a disproportionate amount of agricultural production. In 2014, 
these subsidiary plots produced 80 percent of potatoes, 69 percent of vegetables, and 47 
percent of milk.108 Despite smallholders’ importance to overall productivity of Russian 
agriculture, state support is largely unavailable to them, going instead to the large operators 
who produce the bulk of Russia’s grain. Instead of acting as a true auxiliary system as they 
did in the Soviet era, today household plots are in competition with the massive enterprises. 
As Russia has pushed to become a global agricultural player, industrialized agricultural 
production reigns. Russian food policy priorities, as a subset of domestic and foreign 
policy, are pursued entirely within the realm of these enterprises, thereby making it difficult 
                                                 
106 Liefert, William M. and Olga Liefert. 2015. "Russia's Economic Crisis and its Agricultural and Food 
Economy." Choices, 30.1 (2015). http://choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/submitted-articles/russias-
economic-crisis-and-its-agricultural-and-food-economy 
107 Rada, 6. 
108 Goncharov, V. “The Production Potential of the Russian Agro-Industrial Complex.” Problems of 
Economic Transition (2018), Vol. 60, 5/6: 356-371. DOI: 10.1080/10611991.2018.1547591 
 40 
for smaller producers to access formal market opportunities within the modern capitalist 
system. 
PUTIN’S FOOD POLICY FROM 2012 TO PRESENT 
When Putin’s third term as President began in 2012, the state had a clear vision for 
its agriculture and food policy. The three objectives – to increase domestic production, 
increase Russia’s share of global markets, and achieve food self-sufficiency—were 
established in the 2010 Food Security Doctrine and firmly situated within its foreign and 
domestic policy via the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020. The 
state’s agricultural recovery during the first decade of the twenty-first century had, for the 
first time, shown Russia that its aspirations were achievable. The reaction, in line with 
wider Russian actions, was to pursue the goals even more aggressively.  
Shortly after Putin returned to the presidency for his third term, the Kremlin 
announced the State Program for Development of Agriculture and Regulation of 
Agricultural Commodities Market in 2013-2020. The State Program 2013-2020, together 
with the 2010 Food Security Doctrine, form the basis of Russia’s current agricultural 
policy. The program stresses accelerated food import substitution and production volume, 
quality improvements in agriculture, technical and scientific support and modernization of 
agriculture, and rural development. State allocations for the development of agriculture and 
food markets during the eight-year period were set at 2.28 trillion rubles or $76 billion.109 
While the program has been amended multiple times since its adoption, the lesson is the 
same: despite market reform and capitalist ventures, the Russian economy is still an 
appendage of the state. From Gorbachev’s initial attempts at restructuring to today, the 
preponderance of Russian agriculture in the international market remains integral to the 
way that the state conceives of and projects its power internationally and asserts its 
legitimacy domestically. The influence of this principle can be seen in many of Russia’s 
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economic and political decisions whereby it prioritizes the protection and projection of its 
food power above other aims. 
Trade protectionism has come to define Putin’s agrarian policy even as he made 
accession to the World Trade Organization a primary goal in the early years of his 
administration.110 Russia’s agricultural lobby, led largely by Gordeyev, strongly opposed 
WTO accession, which places a cap on state aid to agriculture and otherwise theoretically 
limits the state’s ability to implement market-distorting policies and practices. Under 
political pressure, Putin slowed down his WTO ambitions and reverted back to strong 
centralized authority, especially as Russia’s GDP grew from “$200 billion in 1999 to some 
$960 billion in 2006,” which diminished the urgency of WTO membership.111 Despite this 
growth, only a few years later, it became clear that unless Russia opened itself up to foreign 
investment it would never achieve the growth and competitiveness that it sought. On 
August 22, 2012, one month after the State Program 2013-2020 was released, Russia 
finally entered the WTO. This bound Russia’s tariff rate at 11 percent for agricultural 
products and 7.1 percent for non-agricultural products. Russia decreased both import tariffs 
and quotas on meat and livestock, which increased its imports, and tariffs on agricultural 
machinery and fertilizers. 
However, in March 2014, soon after Russia’s WTO accession, the United States, 
the European Union and other countries imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and 
businesses, including Rosselkhozbank, the state-owned agricultural bank; Sodrugestvo, a 
vertically-integrated agricultural enterprise; and VTB bank that in 2019 purchased one of 
the largest grain export terminals at the Black Sea Port of Novorosssiisk. Russia retaliated 
soon after with much broader counter-sanctions on almost a thousand agricultural products, 
banning foods from Australia, United States, the European Union, Norway and other 
countries. Many of the embargoed foods, such as beef, vegetables, and fruits, are those that 
are least accessible to Russia through domestic production. The sanctions and counter-
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sanctions, and other non-tariff barriers like SPS measures, have mitigated the effects of 
WTO accession.  
Ostensibly, the embargo on Western foods was a response to the Western sanctions, 
but it was actually in line with Russia’s long-term policy of import substitution, promotion 
of domestic production support, and economic sovereignty aims. The speed with which the 
specific import bans were announced raised suspicion that the state had already deliberated 
such restrictions. Citing the 2010 Food Security Doctrine and the State Program 2013-
2020, the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economics in Transition stated, “The groundwork 
for anti-sanctions was also laid well before events in 2014. . . Russia’s food security policy 
reflects a worldview in which dependence on imports is considered dangerous.”112 Russia’s 
counter-sanctions appear an almost inevitable expression of its food policy posturing. The 
sanctions accelerated the shift in Russia’s agricultural focus from self-sufficiency to 
economic growth, as the country now assesses the entire sector based not only on self-
sufficiency goals but also on export potential. This has allowed Russia to diversify its 
economy away from energy. For those products that Russia cannot easily provide through 
domestic production, Russia has shifted trading relationships to other countries, such as 
Argentina and China.  
Much like the impact of WTO accession, the true impact of the sanctions on 
Russia’s economic performance generally and wheat production and exports specifically 
is difficult to assess because of simultaneous developments. In 2014, Russia experienced 
other shocks, namely the collapse of oil prices, a financial downturn and ruble devaluation, 
in large part due to capital flight and a decrease in foreign investment encouraged by 
western sanctions. As a result of the extended financial trouble, the state “lacks the 
financial means and technology to modernize [the energy and agricultural sectors] and 
instead devotes only enough resources to them to maintain their stability.”113 Russia’s 
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reliance on energy exports makes it especially vulnerable though the state has attempted to 
diversify away from energy toward sectors like agriculture. However, agriculture itself is 
susceptible as ruble depreciation and global oil price drops have made their way into higher 
prices for agricultural inputs and investments. The devaluation of the ruble also made 
Russian exports more competitive on the global market, so producers began looking 
outward in greater volume. This has placed tremendous demand on the entire agricultural 
sector from input acquisition to export logistics. At the same time that cost of food 
production rose, Russian consumers experienced a significant decline in income that 
depressed overall food expenditures and altered their basket of goods toward cheaper and 
even counterfeited foods.  
This impact on the Russian population is the most easily observable effect. At the 
onset of sanctions, Russia was a net food importer. Despite growth in wheat and 
commodity exports, the state imports high value products, such as meat, nuts and fruits. 
Because of this trade balance, sanctions and counter-sanctions have significant 
implications for the consumption and welfare of Russian citizens: “Of Russia’s $39 billion 
total agricultural and food imports in 2013, $23.5 billion were in the product categories 
affected by the ban.”114 Availability and consumption of higher value goods has decreased 
but the supply of wheat and other staples for which Russia is an exporter has not declined 
significantly. While Russia produces enough staples to meet the caloric needs of its 
population, except for meat and dairy, Russia’s domestic demand for imported goods has 
increased, most of which came from the EU prior to 2014. Russia’s agricultural sector is 
unlikely to find a way to meet the diversity demands of consumers, who have seen their 
options in markets markedly reduced.  
Nevertheless, Russia has extended the food embargo through the end of December 
2019 and remains optimistic about the ability of its food and agriculture sectors to rise to 
the challenge. In April 2019, the Ministry of Economic Development projected an 11 
                                                 
114 Liefert, “Russia’s Economic Crisis.” 
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percent increase in agricultural production over the next five years.115 Despite the 
sanctions, drop in energy prices, and ruble volatility, Russia emerged from its two-year 
recession in 2017 with gross agricultural output increasing 2.4 percent. The record high 
grain harvest was key to this growth and was due to the “combination of improving supply 
inputs, financing availability, state support, and very favorable growing conditions for both 
winter and spring crops.”116 The production of poultry and pork has also expanded though 
beef production has declined. It is clear that Russia plans to maintain its agricultural 
dominance as it has afforded it leverage and respect on the international stage, as well as a 
new dimension of national security.  
  
                                                 
115 Center of Agroanalytics. “Ministry of Economic Development expects agriculture to grow by 11% by 
2024.” Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. http://www.specagro.ru/#/news/one/1276708/ 
116 Ibid. 
 45 
Chapter VI: The Outlook for Russia’s Global Wheat Dominance 
After decades of compounding food policy missteps, Russia has managed to 
become the world’s largest wheat exporter and accomplish much of its import substitution 
and self-sufficiency agendas. The simple story of Russia’s transformation into a major 
exporter throughout the 2000s is increased output due to intensification and yield growth 
and a flood of state and private investment. Between 1990 and 2014, total cultivated area 
for grains decreased to 46 million acres from 63, but wheat cultivation increased by 2.4 
million acres. In 2017, Russia produced 85 million tons of wheat, a 14 percent increase 
over 2016 and a 28 percent increase over 2015.117 Since the turnaround in 2000, Russian 
wheat yields have averaged 2.19 metric tons per hectare. For the same period (2000-2019), 
wheat yields for the Ukraine averaged 3.11 mt/ha, the United States averaged 2.94 mt/ha, 
and the EU averaged 5.3 mt/ha, 40 percent higher than Russia.118 Russia’s wheat yield is 
low for international standards but is trending upward with substantial room for growth. 
The country managed to exceed its average yield consistently after 2013 with record 
harvests from 2016 to 2018, even though the harvest in 2018 suffered from unfavorable 
weather. The country remains a net food importer, but food imports dropped to their lowest 
level in 2017 to 12.7 percent as a share of total imports down from 28.5 percent in 1999, 
though the 2017 figure does not include illegally imported or smuggled goods prohibited 
by the embargo.119  
Such success did not come through a reversal in state intervention or control, nor 
through radical reformation of the sector and the entire agricultural value chain. Even as 
the Soviet successor has managed to overcome its seemingly inexorable fate, the state still 
faces barriers to long-term productivity and profitability. As Russia has relied primarily on 
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short-term fixes over structural change, certainly the future of Russian agriculture and food 
production will encounter many vulnerabilities and opportunities.  
Some factors are unavoidable, like climate and weather, and will continue to be a 
stumbling block regardless of changes in Russia’s food policy. The unpredictability and 
harshness of Russia’s climate alone can undermine policy in bad years, and in good years, 
can make it seem like the country is on the rise again. Other factors present opportunity for 
policy action or inaction that can act to promote stability and growth – or to reverse the 
state’s progress. To this end, the centrality of food policy to Russia’s national security and 
foreign policy agenda is a double-edged sword. The agricultural and food sector receives 
outsized attention and investment from the state and private industry because it is as vital 
to the legitimacy of Russia as a global authority as it was in the first years of the Soviet 
Union. But this attention also results in short-sighted policy in pursuit of isolated goals, 
such as increased wheat or meat production, instead of focusing on the efficiency and 
sustainability of the entire food system. It also becomes a tool in a larger geopolitical 
struggle, as in the 2014 counter-sanctions.  
When Putin came to power, he kept the favorable pieces of Yeltsin’s market 
reforms and scrapped the rest. From the start, he revived large-scale state support for 
agriculture and reasserted its centrality to the overall aspirations of the state. Since 
Khrushchev, the political economy of food and agricultural policy has been constrained by 
the framework built by Stalin’s communist ambitions. It still suffers some of the same 
afflictions, including waste and production inefficiencies, competition between livestock 
and grain, underinvestment in the full agricultural value chain, and overbearing 
protectionism that fails to materialize obvious benefits.  But the state has also shown itself 
able to adapt and overcome. For instance, in 2018, Russia managed to move massive 
amounts of grain from its interior agricultural regions to its Black Sea ports, despite doubts 
from international observers about the infrastructural capacity. Additionally, Russia now 
has what the Soviet Union did not – private industry, multinational firms and massive 
agricultural enterprises that have helped to fill some of the gap left by inefficient 
government approaches. 
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Framed as a facet of national security and foreign power projection, the motivations 
for state preoccupation with agriculture and food production have not changed. Russia has 
simply managed to –temporarily or not – alter the balance of power in its favor. The history 
of food production in the country has taught leaders and society alike that success can be 
fleeting if steps to ensure long-term viability are not taken. It is too soon to tell if Russia’s 
rapid climb to the top of the wheat market is the new status quo or a fleeting victory, but 
Russia certainly will continue to pursue and defend it aggressively and with its full weight 
behind it. 
LEVERAGE AND BALANCE IN THE GLOBAL WHEAT VALUE CHAIN 
As Russia settles into its position as a leading exporter, the rest of the world is left 
to wonder how to respond to Russia’s resurgence in agriculture, especially when it endows 
the country with the power to disrupt world food commodity prices. While there is no 
guarantee that Russia will unlock its full productivity and profitability potential, it is likely, 
given the centrality of food to its overall policy position, that it will remain a major long-
term player. Both wheat-importing countries and wheat-exporting competitors must 
contend with Russia’s newfound success and the uncertainty that its protectionist 
approaches bring. More broadly, all actors are left to manage the uncertainty inherent to 
the global market for wheat and other cereals that is vulnerable to financial and energy 
market fluctuations, weather and climate, and other shocks and phenomena.  
In 2018/19, global production dropped four percent from the 2017/18 levels to the 
lowest level in four years.120 Of the eight top wheat exporters, five – Russia, Australia, the 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the European Union – experienced droughts and other weather 
phenomena that lowered output. The other three major players, United States, Canada, and 
Argentina, achieved modest production increases. In response to this shrinking global 
supply, the price of wheat has increased. This has given some producers, like Argentina, 
incentive to grow more, but absent catalyzing events like a global economic crisis, the 
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supply contraction has not metastasized into a global price spike. But it does convey similar 
lessons to the 2007/8 and 2010-12 food price spikes that were also caused, in part, by 
simultaneous supply contractions due to damaging weather and climate.  
First, both exporters and importers must be prepared for supply to fluctuate, as a 
result of natural causes or due to policy interventions. Weather and climate-related 
instability are a consistent piece of this puzzle. Every major exporter is vulnerable to some 
degree to future weather and climate disruptions that increase the cost of agricultural 
production and decrease yields. Russian agriculture may benefit from warmer 
temperatures, which extend the growing season and open up previously unfavorable land 
for investment, but heavy rains, the second leading cause of crop failure in Russia, are also 
likely to increase due to climate change.121 Climate change will make future harvests more 
variable not only in Russia but worldwide. Beyond weather-related disruptions, export 
restrictions and other trade policies pursued unilaterally by states will affect global supply 
pose market challenges.  
The second lesson then, arising from the interdependence of the global food market, 
is that international cooperation and adaptability in the market for wheat and other 
agricultural products is critical. As seen from 2007 to 2012, volatility in grain supply and 
price has effects that ripple out from the exporting countries. The stability of the wheat 
market is about not only the amount produced in each individual nation, but also the amount 
produced and made available globally. If any major supplier reduces global supply due to 
weather, export restrictions, or otherwise, importers, vulnerable to supply and price 
fluctuations, are forced to look elsewhere. The deficit must be made up by another 
producer. The ability to respond to those changing needs is crucial to avoiding price shocks, 
instability, and increasing food insecurity, especially in recipient countries.  
Disruptions in supply not only affect the global price of wheat but also trading 
patterns. Indeed, Russia’s rise to the top can be considered a disruption that realigned trade 
relationships in its favor. Through the Black Sea, Russia has privileged access to markets 
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in the Middle East and North Africa, which represent an easy and politically valuable outlet 
for its growing production. Demand for wheat is also expected to grow over the next 
decades in the MENA region where, in many countries, steady access to wheat and staple 
products is essential to political stability. The proximity and low-cost of Russian wheat 
enabled Russia to undercut and push out other suppliers in the region to become an 
important supplier for countries including Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. 
However, Russia’s advantage in this realm is not absolute or permanent.  
The primary advantages of Russia’s wheat export market are low wheat prices due 
to large supply, high stocks, low oil prices and a weak ruble, along with state support in 
various forms, including export restrictions. Both may prove to be unreliable in the long-
term. The first, low wheat prices, relies on unpredictable factors in the energy and financial 
markets to remain in Russia’s favor. Additionally, year-to-year output in Russia is highly 
contingent on weather. The second advantage - state support - is also a liability. Russia’s 
proclivity for export restrictions and other trade mechanisms strains international 
relationships and makes Russia an undesirable trading partner. Even fear that Russia may 
resort to its usual tools has distorted the market, as producers hurry to export grain and 
usual price signals are dampened. Together, the unpredictability of Russian wheat prices 
and its food policies, may entice recipient governments to diversify their food sources or 
to abandon Russia entirely to avoid major shocks. Further, because the country’s focus on 
livestock production has incentivized growing low-quality grain, it does not always meet 
the standards of importing countries. Some countries, including Saudi Arabia, which would 
be a strategically important market for Russia, reject Russian wheat due to quality issues. 
In 2018/19, Egypt, which has a national program for subsidized bread, rejected several 
Russian wheat cargoes due to high levels of ergot, a wheat fungus. Egypt also began buying 
wheat from other suppliers as Russia’s supplies contracted and its wheat became more 
expensive.  
Market reactions may induce Russia to foster a more favorable and stable policy 
environment as the competitiveness of its wheat declines, and to adjust production practices 
at home. Already, the Kremlin has shown some willingness to do so, especially as it relies 
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on a growing market to absorb its increased output. Since the 2010 ban, Russia has not 
imposed any wheat export restrictions even during the disappointing 2018/19 harvest when 
Russian officials reassured the market that it would not resort to the same tactics. Russia’s 
accession to the WTO also limits its instruments for state support, which will affect its 
price competitiveness in the global market. Even without such tools, Russia has 
demonstrated the ability to expand its wheat market. Its competitiveness diminishes beyond 
the Black Sea as transport makes Russian wheat more expensive. Nevertheless, the country 
is managing to make inroads in distant markets. This includes Mexico, a natural market for 
U.S. wheat, that has recently pivoted to import some Russian wheat. Additionally, Russia 
has found new trading partners to fill the hole left by the embargo that Russia cannot meet 
with domestic production. Notably, food and agricultural trade between Russia and China 
has surged with China providing Russia with vegetables and fruit in exchange for wheat, 
cereals, and frozen seafood, among other goods.  
Russia’s unique advantages and aggressive growth policy, which have allowed its 
ascent as an exporter, may abate over time. However, it would be imprudent to 
underestimate the staying power of Russian wheat and the extent to which its supply is 
necessary to meet world demand for wheat. It is unlikely that the state will abandon 
altogether its guiding principles that situate agricultural policy as an extension of foreign 
policy and national security. But it is also unlikely that either Russia or other exporters can 
continue without increased cooperation and revised agricultural policy if future instability 
is to be contained. As time goes on and Russia transitions from a newcomer to a deeply 
integrated player in the global food and agricultural market, it is reasonable to expect that 
Russian food policy will also become more bound by the system. In the meantime, trade 
relationships are likely to continue shifting as importing countries react to the wheat prices 
and policy environments of each supplier. Other leading exporters should be prepared to 
respond to sudden changes in supply, especially as demand from importing countries 
responds to instability.  
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